Asian Association of Police Studies（英文）

Asian Association of Police Studies

The 6^th Annual Meeting

17-20 October 2005, Beijing, People’s Republic of China

Policing Strategies Against the 1967 Riots in Hong Kong:

An Insider’s Perspective

Mr Lawrence K.K. Ho

PhD Candidate

Department of Sociology

The University of Hong Kong

E-mail: lkkho@graduate.hku.hk

Dr Chu Yiu Kong

Assistant Professor

Department of Sociology

The University of Hong Kong

E-mail: ykchu@hkucc.hku.hk

19 September 2005

Abstract

This study attempts to examine policing strategies against the 1967 riots in Hong Kong form an insider’s perspective. Based on archival materials and in-depth interviews with the police officers who were directly involved in suppressing the riots, this research has two major observations on government’s anti-riot actions. The regime’s policing strategy was a carefully-drafted one which displayed the wisdom of police authorities in crisis management. It has been witnessed that effective policing plans have been developed in three major crucial stages of policing a disturbance. In the policymaking level, a wait-and-see policing mission was developed by the government leaders after conducting thorough assessment on the crisis. In the implementation level, a set of ‘soft’ strategies were introduced by the police authority to prevent the escalation of riots. In the operational level, the target-oriented tactics were worked out aimed to restore the social orders by raiding the leftist establishments and arresting their key personnel. On the top of this, successfully keeping the top-down commanding hierarchy within the police force also provided a reliable apparatus to the colonial leaders to successfully restore the social order.

This study also finds that the good match between government’s anti-riot actions and public’s orientation at the time of 1967 enabled the colonial leaders to minimize the disruptions brought by the riots. Emphasizing the positive impacts of riots on police’s unity and conformity, interestingly the inputs from policemen showed a sharp deviation from the existing interpretations provided by scholars or leftist writers. The police interviewees demystified the claim that the police force was on the brink of segregation and provided an informed account for the relatively good settlement of local and expatriate officers throughout the full mobilization period in 1967.

Important implications on the current and future policing in Hong Kong could be drawn from the experience in the 1967 riots. Narrations from the interviewees have concluded four major attributes for effective policing of public order events, namely (1) accurately assess the crisis; (2) setting a clear and feasible policing mission; (3) flexibly use of two-prone strategy (both intelligence-based “soft” and confrontational ‘hardcore’ policing approaches); and (4) deployment of appropriate tactics in and secure sufficient backup to the frontline operations. The well application of these strategies successfully pulled the heterozygous-composed police force and citizens together and partly explained the eventual completion of policing mission. Although the socio-political condition in Hong Kong has been largely different, it is believed that the experience may serve as a valuable reference for studying the public order management nowadays.

1. Introduction

The 1967 riots were widely regarded as the worst civil unrest in the Hong Kong history. The riots were triggered by an industrial dispute which later escalated into violent clashes between the workers and the police. Subsequently the local leftists used the opportunity to challenge the Hong Kong government. The Hong Kong Police were highly appreciated by the authority for its ‘out-performance’ in restoring the social order. To recognize the contribution of the Hong Kong Police in effectively dealing with the riots, Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II bestowed the title ‘Royal’ to the Hong Kong Police in April 1968. In the eyes of the local Chinese leftists, it was nevertheless considered the Hong Kong Police as the ‘running dog’ of the British colonialists who ruthlessly suppressed their compatriots. By contrast, some academics are puzzled how this non-fully localized and unpopular police force was able to control these large scale riots successfully in 1967.

This study attempts to examine policing strategies against the 1967 riots in Hong Kong from an insider’s point of view. To present a complete picture of the policing strategies used during the riots, this paper will investigate the issue from three levels: the decision making level, the implementation level and the operational level. The data of this research are largely derived from archival materials and in-depth interviews with the police officers who were directly involved in suppressing the riots. Totally 16 police officers who resumed frontline policing assignments amid the riots were interviewed. The interviewees include officers from the ex-Police Training Contingent (PTC) (The Riots Suppression Team), Uniform Branch, traffic and intelligence units (see Appendix 1).

2. The Decision Making Level

2.1 The Pre-crisis Preparation

The success of policing the 1967 riots can be traced back to the good pre-crisis preparation work introduced by the colonial government. After the Double October Riots in 1956, the Hong Kong Police took initiative to modernize and strengthen its para-military force to deal with large scale riots. In addition, the government intended to ‘purify’ the police force by introducing a more stringent vetting exercise in the staffing process.

The colonial government learnt from the unpleasant experience in the 1956 riots that the police force was not properly trained to deal with violent urban riots. In 1957 the Police Tactical Contingent (PTC) was set up. It was composed of 4 companies with each about 170 anti-riot police officers. A company served Hong KongIsland, Kowloon and NewTerritories respectively. The remaining company was aliased as the ‘Imperial army’ and stationed at the Police Headquarters waiting for emergency orders.

A well-developed set of anti-riot tactics was taught to the PTC members. The practice to delegate the riot drill training to each police division was revised. The PTC became the central institution which taught the frontline policemen the anti-riot tactics on a regular basis.[1] New tactics were also introduced to the anti-riot platoon formation aimed to increase the flexibility and effectiveness of crowd management.[2] The logistics coordination in rioting period was revisited and measures were taken to improve the coordination within the force.[3] The Auxiliary Police were reorganized and all the members were trained to provide supporting functions to the regular force in emergency.[4]

The outbreak of the 1956 riots also alarmed the government to build up a police force without political inclination. Unlike the staffing exercise in the early 1950s, the police recruitment procedure was more regularized. All recruits were assured that they did not have political affiliation through a stringent vetting exercise. All applicants must submit at least two referee reports of serving civil servants before their appointment could be verified. These new vetting procedures, making sure that no member of the Hong Kong Police had political affiliation with either Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, later proved to be an essential and successful step contributing to the allegiance of the police to the colonial government in the subsequent anti-riot policing actions.

2.2 Risk Assessment

Right after the outbreak of mass demonstrations outside the Government House escalated from an industrial dispute, it saw the excellent performance crisis management of the colonial government in which it effectively hindered the aggravation of social conditions. A policing mission was set to confine the political activities at the earliest stage of upheaval, given the non assurance of Beijing attitude to the riots triggered by the local leftists. The government also alerted the unpopularity and potential disloyalty of its non-fully localized police force.

The colonial government in fact had initial hesitation in designing its anti-riot strategy right after the industrial disputes in the San Po Kong district. When the policemen generally disregarded the sensitivity of industrial disputes, the colonial leaders were puzzled by the possible involvement of Beijing government in the event and soon sought the advice from London.[5] The colonial government has to assess if the confrontations, strikes and bomb attack were ordered from Beijing or just the actions acting on their own initiative as a result of the synthetic enthusiasms of the Cultural Revolution.[6]

Another worry in the mind of colonial leaders came from the readiness of Hong Kong Police Force. It was doubted that the unpopularity of Hong Kong Police Force among the public would affect the effective execution of anti-riot actions. The poor public image of the Hong Kong Police would even fuel troubles to colonial administration under the leftist appeal to ‘beat the yellow-skin pig who swear their allegiance to the imperialist’.[7] As a respondent described: “After the establishment of the ‘Struggle Committee’ and seeing the banners with provocative slogan of condemning the Chinese policeman as ‘running dogs of the imperialists’, we are often verbally assaulted by the rioters; feel the pressure and start to realize the severity of event.” (Police Interview, 14 July 2005).

Another key concern of the colonial leaders was the loyalty crisis of the Chinese officers in the police. Historically, the colonial government seemed not rely only on the local policemen to deal with some political sensitive incidents. A typical organizational feature of the Hong Kong Police in 1960s was its non-localized leadership. Most hegemony positions in the force were occupied by the expatriates. A coercive top-down commanding line was developed along the hierarchy under the para-military setting. The local rank and files officers, together with the Indian and Pakistanis recruits, discharged their duties under the commandership of the overseas force members.[8] Obviously, the ethnic-segregated and non locally-led police force would be disorganized when its representation was questioned by the ethnic Chinese.

Indeed most of our police respondents admitted that they did have some kind of sympathy to the workers. An interviewee says that he personally agreed with workers’ appeal to get rid of employers’ deprivation considered it as justified and reasonable demands (Police Interview, 2 June 2004). However, after extensive and non-stop insults mounted by the local leftists, the mainstream Chinese police officers gradually sidelined their initial passion to the partisans and fully devoted to the violence suppression work under the leadership of expatriate superiors.

2.3 Setting the Policing Target

As the British authority has yet to realize the policy orientation of Beijing, it was witnessed that a ‘clashes-avoidance’ policing approach was used in dealing with the mass demonstrations. ‘Maintaining social order with greatest restraint’ was set as the guiding principle to develop all the policing actions against the escalating violence. Uncertain if the violence was originated from local grievances or involving the Beijing factor, a policing mission was set by the colonial government aimed to clamp down on the possibilities for further riots.

Under the banner of “maintaining social order”, the government aimed not to give any excuses to the leftists for the escalation of confrontation and creating any incidents.[9] The Governor Sir David Trench sought to confine the riots until the London government has acknowledged the bottom-line of Beijing. Fearing the massive retaliation from China, no major arrests could be witnessed; even the batons and tear gas hadn’t been used in the confrontation scenes. When the government announced its determination to quell the actions to disrupt the social order, also took attempts to isolate the protesting crowds, by emphasizing the publicity of a purely industrial dispute as a result of the manipulation of ‘the unscrupulous minority’. The government leaders also appealed the citizens to clam down and expressed their ideas through lawful and peaceful means, despite their dissatisfaction with the imperfections of the Hong Kong community.[10]

3. The Implementation Level

Facilitated by the narrations of police interviewees, several deployments have been noted under this policing framework. Firstly, the establishment of a Special Group to coordinate the anti-riot actions. Secondly, getting contact with the British Force to secure their backup in future operations. Thirdly, telling the frontline policemen not to succumb to the provocative actions from the protesters. Fourthly, intensification of both intelligence and ground appreciation work launched by the policing authority. Managers of the public utilities were approached and put pressure to sack their employees who participated in strikes. Fifthly, media management was emphasized to improve police’s image. The police were repositioned as an impartial law enforcer to safeguard public and private property in official publications promptly distributed to the public. Lastly, steps were taken by the government to strengthen the organizational allegiance and uplift the morale of frontline policemen.

3.1 The Establishment of the Special Group

The first action launched by the government under the passive approach was to create a special taskforce to deal with the crises. The ad hoc ‘Special Group’, headed by Secretary of Defense Jack Cater, was formed in July 1967 to closely supervise the situations and worked out the appropriate strategy to prevent the escalation of riots.[11]

The narrations provided by some attendees of the group have highlighted its planning and coordinating duties of anti-riot actions launched by the government. As an ad hoc establishment to gather the heads of various government departments regularly, the group strengthened the inter-departments communication, and somehow functioned as an intelligence centre allowing the government leaders to acknowledge the most-updated development of the riots through the information supplied from different departments who have frequent and direct contacts with citizens. It was said that the group met every morning during the summer of 1967 to inform Governor David Trench of what happened the night before and received advice from him.[12]

The group also assumed another significant duty to distribute the implementation directives to frontline agencies. The taskforce ensured the conformity, accuracy and effectiveness disseminated of the policing missions and strategy of government top leaders and coordinated the implementation work in which varying departments would take charge of message dissemination. Again, the group was said to be heavily engaged in informing and influencing public opinion against the leftist campaign of anti-government propaganda. Specific actions were then taken by regular agencies to satisfy public desires. For instance, the Transport Department reported frequently on the impact of the riots on vital transport operations. Radio Hong Kong increased special interest broadcasts, and Government Information Services issued daily information bulletin to explain the government's purposes. These worked to help explain government responses to the struggle campaign.[13]

3.2 Securing the Support from British Military Side

The second strategy was to secure the backup support from the British military side amid the uncertainty. The government took a low key approach to intensify the liaison with the British troops in Hong Kong by setting up an office to coordinate the anti-riot actions throughout the riots. The office, called Pol-Mil (acronym of Police and Military) was basically the operations rooms at Colony Police Headquarters and at District Headquarters which were jointly manned throughout the year from the beginning of the confrontation period.[14] (Police Interview, 7 March & 14 July 2005).

As described by a respondent, the Pol-Mil was assigned to oversee the daily operation of the policing work within a region. The inspectorate grade police officers in the Pol-mil were responsible for the coordination work with the representatives from military crops in which it mainly performed the supporting role in the policing job throughout the 1967 riots (Police Interview, 7 March and 14 July 2005).

The coordination with the military side provided effective backup to the policing actions launched by the Hong Kong Police. It witnessed the constant cooperation between Army Units and their police counterparts in carrying out various operations both in the NewTerritories and in the urban areas, particularly since July 1967 in which the British government began to realize Beijing’s policy orientation to keep Hong Kong under its administration.

3.3 Adopting the Non-confrontational Crowd Management

A non-confrontational strategy was adopted in crowd management with the objectives to scale down the riots and galvanize the public support to the colonial government. Both archival materials and narrations from policemen also indicated the use of soft tactics in the infant stage of the riots, provided that the failure of government elites to assure Beijing’s attitude towards the locally initiated actions.

To Keep Away from the Crowd

Our respondents generally emphasized that they have offered their greatest patience to the violent actions organized by the leftists. Most police interviewees pointed out that they were repeatedly reminded to restrain from taking ‘over-aggressive’ actions when confronting the protesters, dealing the confrontations with the demonstrators who were composed of the laid-off factory workers, students from leftist schools and unionists. As an interviewee recalls: “We were told to continuously show determination in maintaining law and order. We were also reminded to show greatest steadiness to the provocative actions from the demonstrators until getting further instructions.” (Police Interview, 18 August 2004).

Another interviewee who had involved in an assignment outside the aforementioned scene also emphasized that one key instruction he received was to avoid unnecessary conflicts and clashes with the revolting crowds. He explains:

We do not intend to stop the demonstrations. The demonstrators, mostly workers and students, normally marshaled at the Bank of China Building at Central and paraded to the Government House at Upper Albert Road. Confronting with more than 2500 demonstration crowd who chanting the quotations of Mao’s thoughts outside the Government House, all policemen are unarmed. This is called “soft-order”, and it is the typical feature in the infant stage of the policing strategy. We have all received this tactics training which aimed at avoiding physical contacts with the crowd. The tactics aims to keep low key, at least lasting for two months….

(Police Interview, 5 August 2005)

Another respondent memorizes the instruction from his Commander which reminded him to keep patient throughout an operation. He says: “In an operation to a Towngas premise in Hunghom, my expatriate PTC platoon Commander reminded us ‘not to take hardcore actions’ and ‘could not use your gun at any circumstances’.”[15] (Police Interview, 17 July 2005).

These narrations clearly showed the carefulness of British government in dealing with the early riots. Obviously, the police employed a relatively tolerant approach aimed to ‘facilitate the smooth of demonstrations’. The police were told to offer their ‘greatest steadiness and restraint’ in discharging their duties. Officers were deployed to remove the ‘inflammatory posters and banners’ in the streets but no major arrest actions have been taken.

To Deploy Policewomen to Crowd Management

An inspiring finding from the frontline police inputs was the essential roles of women officers in the policing actions against the riots, particularly in the confrontational scenes in early May 1967. Recalled by a female respondent, women constables were also called upon to the rioting scenes to minimize the possibility of bloodshed episodes. Apart from the indoor assignments like to coordinate the logistics support, women officers were ordered to be ready for the crowd management at confrontational scenes. As the female officer remembered, she and her ladies counterparts were instructed to ‘keep the protesters away’ from the government premises (Police Interview, 25 July 2005).

Examining the official photos capturing the gatherings outsides the Government House in May and early June of 1967, we could witness the aforesaid episode. Surprisingly, the policewomen were in fact an indispensable constituent under the strategy of crowd management throughout the riots. Deploying the unarmed women officers to the frontline of demonstrations was clearly part of the ‘soft tactics’ adopted by the colonial authority to prevent the escalation of violence. It was easier for them to deal with the female demonstrators than that of their male counterparts. This finding, definitely, contradicted to the widely accepted proposition that policewomen were just an insignificant portion in the Hong Kong Police Force as well as in the history of colonial policing.[16]

3.4 Intelligence-based Policing and Putting Pressure on Public Utilities

Under the soft tactics, the government appeared highly regarded the intelligence works in facilitating its anti-riot actions. The police authority sent intelligence officers to conduct close range surveillance and systematic monitoring of suspected pro-Beijing targets in which their activities were considered as potential threats to internal security.

The policemen belonged to the Criminal Investigation Branch during the riots have assumed the intelligence soliciting duties in support with the anti-riot actions taken by their counterparts of anti-riot platoons. They mainly assigned to conduct the ground appreciation work of the target institutions. They were also sent to approach the pro-government organizations, like the Kaifong associations and neighborhood committees, to collect the information of key personnel of leftist institution for planning the policing actions. A telephone hotline was also established for the citizens to provide rioting information.[17]

Interviewees tended to suggest that the good ground appreciation and intelligence work was one of key factors leading to the success of raids to leftist premises since July 1967. An interviewee remembers: “I have taken part in the raid of Metropole and Wah Fung Department Store. Before the raids, we have been well-informed the conditions inside both buildings. We basically know the number and types of offensive objects they equipped.” (Police Interviews, 25 July & 2 August 2005)

The government took attempt to confine that the adverse impacts brought by the strike and sabotage appeals to paralyze the local economy. Pressure has been exerted on public utilities management to sack the workers who took part in strikes. For example, the bus maintenance staff, the sailors and the craftsman of public utility companies. Meanwhile, the government also dismissed the civil servants who followed the campaigns called by the leftists. Figures released by the government showed that more than 1,500 employees were sacked.[18] Announcing to provide both monetary and material accommodations to the sacked members, the leftist unions soon encountered financial hardship as increasing compensation requests were received. The non-confrontational strategy indeed effectively undermined the strength of leftist circle.

3. 5 Galvanizing Public Supports through Media Management

The colonial leaders also tried to comfort the citizens and appeal for their support to the government throughout the riots. In fact, speculation has arisen if the British would retreat from Hong Kong under the prolonged riots, although it was not the preferable outcomes of most citizens. Meanwhile, the territories had then been full of rumors. Some described that the Beijing authority had been ready to take back Hong Kong, while some ‘observed’ that the British had strengthened the military establishments of Hong Kong so as to safeguard her economic interest in Hong Kong. These rumors had posed great psychological impacts on the Hong Kong citizens as majority of them were unable to judge the accuracies of these reports under the information-deprived condition.[19]

To Marginalize the Rioters

The government also tried to marginalize the rioters by denouncing the unethical acts of leftist organizations. Government publications have reported that most ‘rioters’ were innocent school children who were bolstered up to take part in the organized riots. Some of them were unemployed figures hired by the leftist establishments to ‘disrupt the social order’ by planting either real or fake bombs on the streets[20](Police Interview, 2 June 2004). The attempt to disseminate unfavorable literatures to the leftist organizations was proven to be very effective which allowed the government to take more aggressive actions to suppress the riots under public support.

It also witnessed the government’s attempt to make use of media to dispel the leftist propaganda. To stress the conformity of the police force, the government released that the staffing work of both regular and auxiliary force members was promising and showed no deviation from the non-disturbance time.[21] On the one hand, the government praised the ‘valuable assistance from the Auxiliary Police’ in suppressing the riots. In dispelling the leftist claim of police’s disorganization, the government announced that nearly 99% of the strength of total 2400 auxiliary officers had reported for duty since the mobilization order introduced on 11 May 1967.[22] (see Appendix 2).

Propaganda

During the riots, the Government Information Service has published a booklet to demonstrate the work of government and built up the image for the Hong Kong Police as the ‘Guardian of People’. The publication emphasized the role of police in to disrupt the social disorders. At both front and back covers of the booklets, it saw the extracts of applauses and tributes to the Police Force in Chinese and English newspapers.[23](see Appendix 3).

Alongside the booklet, pamphlets were also published to highlight the meritocracy of the Hong Kong Police in overseas. The pamphlet published for staffing purpose described the ‘attractive prospect of perusing a career in the Police Force’, which could ‘offer an opportunity for a life that will be anything but dull’. More important, it set to quote the goodness of the Hong Kong Police as recognized by the pubic during the 1967 riots. In the booklet, it reads that

In recent riots the Hong Kong Police Force won renewed praise for their training and behavior.”. It also quoted the appreciation from the London Daily Mail “Throughout the acutest provocation the police have shown outstanding immaculate discipline and restraint. In all my reporting experience, including police action in the worst trouble spots in Africa in the past seven years, I have seen nothing like it.[24]

It could be seen that at the very beginning the public generally showed sympathy toward the workers who took part in the strike. However, gradual politicization and development of the riots worried the citizens as they began to feel unsafe after prolong turbulences, especially when they saw innocent people and police officers got injured. The majority of the public started to turn to support the government. Adoption of the ‘delaying strategy’ in the mass demonstration stage in fact gained most of the public support amid the continuing disturbance. Spiritual and passionate support from the mainstream citizens consolidated the commitment of the frontline police officers in discharging their policing duties. With the public supports, the government eventually took a more firm attitude in dealing with confrontations in a later period.

3.6 Uplifting the Morale of Policemen

The last and the most significant and integral part of the policing strategy was to ensure the readiness of the Hong Kong Police in executing the policing decisions. It was witnessed that the government also showed extra caution to the devastating impacts of these rumors on police’s unity and conformity. The leaders realized the potential crisis on allegiance of the ethnic-segregated composition of the Hong Kong Police Force. It had drawn widespread concern that the Chinese policemen had to overcome an uneasy moment as they had to swear their loyalties to the colonial government. In fact, the local communists had taken attempts to undermine the loyalty of the Chinese policemen by emphasizing the ‘discrimination’ existing in the police department. They had called upon the Chinese within the force ‘to turn their guns on the Government’.[25]

It saw the efforts of the government to avoid the potential disorganization of the police force by upholding the banner of ‘restoration to social order’ throughout the riots. The government introduced both monetary incentives and continuously showed its support by the public to consolidate the cooperation between the expatriates and locals in the police forces and even fuel extra eagerness for the Chinese policemen to suppress the riots.

A step taken by government to consolidate the force was to improve the benefits of frontline policemen. Throughout the riots, all police officers could get additional allowance in both cash and supplies.[26] An additional 3% increase was announced; while extra steps to comfort dependents of the policemen. The auxiliaries were sent to safeguard both the police stations and the staff quarters. All basic commodities, like rice, vegetables, would be provided to the police families living in the quarters. Meanwhile, a Police Education and Welfare Trust Fund was established in May 1967. It accumulated the donation from the public and aimed to provide monetary subsidies to the police dependents for schooling purpose.[27] It also saw different private companies have provided some privileges to the policemen to ‘express their appreciations’ of ‘excellent performance’ by the police during the riots.[28] (Police Interviews, 11 May, 2 June and 18 August 2004).

In fact, the extra monetary stimulus effectively boosted up the morale among Chinese policemen. Under the banner of ‘maintaining social order’, the colonial leaders successfully depoliticized the political disruptions and consolidated the police force. This could be evident from the emphasis of most interviewees that they were contributing to the social stability of the territories but not sticking their allegiance to the British government. As an interviewee described: “What could I do if I quit from police department, I am just a primary graduate. I now have the double salary of the past when being a mentee….. I do not have thorough understanding on what was happening. I am politically apathetic and of course didn’t have the feeling of ‘helping the alien colonialists.’” (Police Interview, 16 July 2005).

Narrations from the police respondents revealed that government’s actions to improve their remuneration packages have improved the cohesion of the police force. It endowed them sufficient mental comfort; and also made the police claim themselves receiving widespread popular support in discharging policing actions. Stressing the ‘holy and necessary’ of the counter-insurgency actions, the government successfully dispel the leftists’ challenges to the Chinese policemen for their loyalty to an imperialist regime. Putting the ‘allegiance’ question aside, the police force was consistently in good morale throughout the half-year riots.

It even witnessed the positive development of the expatriate-local relationship within the police in face of a common danger. This simply demystified the scholarly claims that the police force has been on the brink of disorganization during the riots in 1967. The government successfully made the police feel that they were supported by the public. In fact the citizens gradually sidelined their initial sympathy towards the leftists and supported to the violence suppression work under the leadership of British leaders after the continuing and extensive disruptions.

4. The Operational Level

It saw that the policing strategy was redefined to the ‘restoration of social order’ after acknowledging Beijing’s orientation. Legislations, raids and arrests became the key parameters in the policing tactics to the bomb terrorism started in July 1967. The leftist unions, department stores, schools and news agency were raided under the joint actions with the military personnel, which aimed to destabilize the leftist camp and end the social disorder.

A target-oriented tactics were worked out in the anti-riot operations to raid to leftist establishments in Hong Kong and arrest their key personnel. The government declared to take more hard line to ‘restore the social order’ since mid-July 2005. [29] The police were empowered to take raids and arrests.[30] Statement was issued to emphasize that the police were ready to defend themselves if meeting violence when arresting law-breaker.[31] The leftist unions, department stores, schools and news agency were raided under the joint actions with the military personnel. The seizure of weapons and ammunitions, together with the arrest of key leftist figures, aimed to destabilize the leftist camp and end the social disorder since May.[32]

4.1 Who Would be Raided and Why?

Among the many pro-Beijing partisan organisations in Hong Kong, the British Government had specifically targeted the following three types for careful and continuous scrutiny. They were leftist schools, press, and labour unions. The leftist schools were selected because of their ideological indoctrination on local youth. The pro-Beijing press was singled out as they acted the mouthpieces on behalf of Beijing. The leftist unions were targeted due to their large organizational network among the working grassroots in which their collective actions would destabilize the society.[33]

Nevertheless, China’s ‘stateorganisation’ in Hong Kong were always not in the raid target list. An police inspector respondent described: “We never go to Bank of China and New China News Agency. They are considered to be political sensitive, although they are believed to be very much involved. Their key personnel were not arrested, nor were the three major pro-Beijing dailies banned. We only raid the left-wing schools, unions and shops….” (Police Interview, 14 July 2005).

4.2 Joint Operations with British Military Personnel

The government also secured the backup from the military side so as to assure the effective implementation of the policing actions and so the situation would not be out of control. The British army was on continual stand-by since the start of upheaval in mid-May 1967. Several vessels of British Far East Navy were arranged to visit Hong Kong throughout the rioting period.[34] A report quoting the declaration from the spokesmen of British army, said that ‘The police and the army are complementary, the army was particularly useful for forming an effective cordon on big operations, such as the raid on left-wing unions’.[35]

Narrations of the police interviewees unanimously suggested the essential role of British army in the policing of riots (see Appendix 4). In fact, news reports also displayed that most raiding parties were made up of both the regular anti-rioting companies of the Hong Kong Police and the military personnel of the British Forces in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, it appeared that the military side never dominated in operations. They only took a subsidiary role to facilitate the search and arrest actions executed by the anti-riot platoons of Hong Kong Police. In a ‘small’ operation, like the swoop of club houses of the leftist-affiliated trade unions, it witnessed that at least an anti-riot company would be deployed. A Superintendent would take charge of the commandership and organized the search and arrest actions.

Meanwhile, more intensified cooperation between the police and the military could be noted in some operations targeted with the communist ‘strongholds’, like the raids on Workers’ Club in Tokwawan on 16 July 1967; two leftist emporiums on 27 July 1967; and the largest raid of Wah Fung Emporium on 4 August 1967. We could see the policy authority would deploy at least two companies of the anti-riot team. In some cases the detectives would also been called upon so as to speed up the search actions over the premises. More important, the simultaneous involvement of military personnel in these raids. In these ‘joint operations’, a Chief Superintendent or gazetted officer (usually an Assistant Commissioner) would take over the directorship. The troops (normally at least a battalion of the British Force would be called) facilitated the operation by providing backup support to the regular force members. They would block all the entries of the targeted premises and condoned off the surroundings area in avoidance of retaliation from leftist figures throughout the raids.

In some vast operations, the army could provide not only the logistic support to the police but also assume the training role before the execution of actions plans in several massive operations. In the raid carried out on Wah Fung emporium on 4 August 2005, it has been reported that more than 1,000 men and soldiers and three Westland Whirlwind helicopters from the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes took part in the raids in North Point on 4 August 1967. The military airlifted the policemen coming from Bay view Police Station to the roofs of leftist premises and started the search and arrest actions inside the building.[36] An interviewee described,

I was attached to the Bayview police station at that time. One night, our company commander said we have an important operation ahead and we all transported to the Lei Yue Mun Garrison to receive a week of aircraft landing exercises under the instruction of the military personnel. On a night on early August, we boarded the HMS Hermes after attending a pre-action briefing, climbing up the helicopters and began to know that we were assigned to take part in a land-ground operation swooped on three building in North Point. We have been aircrafted and landed on the roofs of the KiuKoonBuilding, marching into the cubicles and arresting the men inside it. After arriving the main entrance of the building at the ground floor, I surprisingly found that a electrocution device has been set up at the main gates. My colleagues would be electrocuted if the commander decided to march in the premises. At that time, I truly feel the good intelligence work and wisdom of our leadership.

(Police interview, 2 August 2005)

Meanwhile, the joint actions of police and military usually took place in the early morning. The news report usually described the lighting actions launched by the anti-rioting platoons were ‘met with no major resistance’ or ‘without any interference from outside’.[37] In fact, this should not be attributed to luck but simply reveal the profound action plan worked out by the police authority. In most cases, the leftists inside the targeted premises were unaware of the attacks and thus took no precautious actions beforehand. As supplied by some interviewees, the police’s actions were usually welcomed by the residents nearby and sometimes they even clapped their hands and shouted “arrest them all” when observing the mass arrest of leftist figures.[38]

5. Discussions

The police’s narrations unveil the foundations of government’s anti-riot actions in several dimensions. Firstly, in the level of risk assessment, the colonial leaders has alerted of the potential allegiance problem of the Chinese officers within the non-fully localized police force at the earliest of upheaval. Given the non assurance of Beijing’s attitude to the local leftist initiated riots, the government set the policing mission to confine the political activities. Inter-departmental coordination within the Hong Kong government was strengthened in preparation for the aggravation of social disorders under the continuing demonstrations and strike appeals. Liaison between the colonial government and British army was strengthened to secure the backup from military personnel in anti-riot policing actions and ascertain that the situation would not be out of control.

Secondly, ‘maintaining social order with greatest restraint’ was set as the guiding principle to develop all the policing actions against the escalating violence. A non-confrontational approach was adopted in crowd management with the objectives to scale down the riots and galvanize the public support to the colonial government in the early stage of the riots. When the frontline policemen were told not to succumb to the provocative actions from the protesters, it witnessed the intensification of both intelligence and ground appreciation work launched by the policing authority. Managers of the public utilities were approached and put pressure to sack their employees who participated in strikes. Under the clashes-avoidance strategy, it also saw the emphasis on media management by the government. The police was imaged as an impartial law enforcer to safeguard public and private property in official publications promptly distributed to the public. Meanwhile, steps were taken by the government to uplift the morale of front-line policemen. It has been seen that the police respondents generally thought that the force was consistently in good morale throughout the half-year riots.[39]

Thirdly, a strategy-shift was undertaken stressing the ‘restoration of social order’ after acknowledging Beijing’s orientation. Legislations, raids and arrests became the key parameters in the policing tactics to the bomb terrorism started in July. The leftist unions, department stores, schools and news agency were raided under the joint actions with the military personnel. The seizure of weapons and ammunitions, together with the arrest of key leftist figures, aimed to destabilize the leftist camp and end the social disorder since May. Facilitated by Beijing’s announcement of ‘long-term struggle against British imperialism’, the half-year prolonged riots were gradually scaled down by the end of 1967.

6. Conclusion

The aim of this paper is to examine policing strategies against the 1967 riots in Hong Kong form an insider’s perspective. This research finds that the regime’s policing strategy was a carefully-drafted one which displayed the wisdom of police authorities in crisis management. It has been witnessed that effective policing plans have been developed in three major crucial stages of policing a disturbance. In the policymaking level, a wait-and-see policing mission was developed by the government leaders after conducting thorough assessment on the crisis. In the implementation level, a set of ‘soft’ strategies were introduced by the police authority to prevent the escalation of riots. In the operational level, the target-oriented tactics were worked out aimed to restore the social orders by raiding the leftist establishments and arresting their key personnel. On the top of this, successfully keeping the top-down commanding hierarchy within the police force also provided a reliable apparatus to the colonial leaders to successfully restore the social order.

This study also finds that the good match between government’s anti-riot actions and public’s orientation at the time of 1967 enabled the colonial leaders to minimize the disruptions brought by the riots. Emphasizing the positive impacts of riots on police’s unity and conformity, interestingly the inputs from policemen showed a sharp deviation from the existing interpretations provided by scholars or leftist writers. The police interviewees demystified the claim that the police force was on the brink of segregation and provided an informed account for the relatively good settlement of local and expatriate officers throughout the full mobilization period in 1967.

Important implications on the current and future policing in Hong Kong could be drawn from the experience in the 1967 riots. Narrations from the interviewees have concluded four major attributes for effective policing of public order events, namely (1) accurately assess the crisis; (2) setting a clear and feasible policing mission; (3) flexibly use of two-prone strategy (both intelligence-based “soft” and confrontational ‘hardcore’ policing approaches); and (4) deployment of appropriate tactics in and secure sufficient backup to the frontline operations. The well application of these strategies successfully pulled the heterozygous-composed police force and citizens together and partly explained the eventual completion of policing mission. Although the socio-political condition in Hong Kong has been largely different, it is believed that the experience may serve as a valuable reference for studying the public order management nowadays.

Appendix 1:

Portfolio of the Police Interviewees

All interviews were conducted in between January 2004 and August 2005Appendix 2:

Figures of Retirement and Casualties in HKP, 1967-68

Source:

Police Commissioner’s report, 1967-68. Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968

Appendix 3:

Extracts of Government’s propaganda describing the work of Hong Kong Police in 1967 riots

Source:

Government Information Services (1967) Guardian of People (制止暴行是警察的職責) Hong Kong: Government Printer

Appendix 4:

Raids taken by the Hong Kong Police in the 1967 Riots involving the military personnel

Source

South China Morning Post; Sing Tao Jih Po; June-August, 1967.

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